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MARYLAND'S NEW CONDEMNATION CODE
By GEORGE W. BAKER, JR.,*
and PHILIP Z. ALTFELD**
I. INTRODUCTION
At its 1963 session, the General Assembly of Maryland
completely revised the Eminent Domain Law of Maryland
by substituting for the existing Article 33A of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland an entirely new and comprehen-
sive body of laws. Its action was not precipitous, for it had
long been apparent that the Condemnation Laws' were
inadequate.
Historically, the Constitution of Maryland provides that
the "General Assembly shall enact no Law authorizing
private property to be taken for public use, without just
compensation."2 A similar limitation is contained in the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.'
But the universally accepted translation of "just compen-
sation" has been limited to "fair market value" of the real
estate on the valuation date; such an inflexible limitation
* Of the Maryland Bar. A.B. Loyola College, 1943; LL.B., University of
Maryland, School of Law, 1949. Mr. Baker is a former Judge of the Orphans'
Court of Baltimore City and a former Deputy City Solicitor of Baltimore.
While holding the latter office, he represented the City in the drafting of
the new Condemnation Code.
** Of the Maryland Bar. A.B. Franklin and Marshall College, 1953;
LL.B., University of Maryland, School of Law, 1956. Mr. Altfeld was an
Assistant City Solicitor in the trial section, specializing in condemnation
cases, from 1959 to 1962.1 As used herein, the word "Condemnation" means acquisition of private
property for public use by condemnation (eminent domain) proceedings.
M). CONST., Art. III, § 40. For a history of this section, see Patterson
v. Baltimore, 127 Md. 233, 96 A. 458 (1915). Cf. Declaration of Rights,
Art. XXIII. It has long been a fundamental principle of constitutional
law that the power of eminent domain is a prerogative of sovereignty and
does not require the sanction of the Constitution for the State to exercise
it. Riden v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 182 Md. 336, 35 A. 2d 99 (1944) ;
Moale v. Baltimore, 5 Md. 314 (1854). In the absence of a constitutional
limitation, private property could theoretically be taken for public use
without payment to the owner, but the requirement of "just compensation"
was a part of the common law of England and the general law of European
nations. Pumpelly v. Canal Co., 13 Wallace 166, 178 (U.S. 1872) ; Turnpike
Road v. Railroad Co., 81 Md. 247, 256, 31 A. 854 (1869) ; I NIcHoLs,
EMINENT DOMAIN (3rd ed. 1950) § 1.2, et 8eq.
8The limitation in the Fifth Amendment originally was held to apply
only to condemnation by the federal government, Barron v. City of Balto.,
7 Peters 243 (U.S. 1833), but since the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment it has been held also applicable to condemnation by the States,
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) ; Scott v. Toledo,
36 F. 385, 1 L.R.A. 688 (6th Cir., 1888).
'State Roads Commission v. Warriner, 211 Md. 480, 485, 128 A. 2d 248
(1957) ; Pumphrey v. State Roads Commission, 175 Md. 498, 506, 2 A. 2d
663 (1938); Cons. G.E.L. & P. Co. v. Baltimore, 130 Md. 20, 30, 99 A.
968 (1917).
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of damages often resulted in hardship to the property
owner.5
The Condemnation Code which was enacted in 19128
gave no more than the Constitutional minimum and had
remained basically unchanged until the revision in 1963.7
With the increased tempo in the last decade of public ac-
quisition of property for new schools, highways and urban
renewal, complaints multiplied because of its inadequacies
and inequities. As a result, the Legislative Council in 1955
requested its Research Division to make a thorough analy-
sis of the State's Condemnation Laws and to report its find-
ings to the Council. Its report was submitted in August,
1958, and following recommendations therein, bills were
introduced and passed by the General Assembly providing
for payment of moving costs where property is condemned
and for compensation where condemnation is abandoned.8
Dissatisfaction with the Condemnation Law continued,
however. In 1959 the Bar Association of Baltimore City ap-
pointed a special committee of ten persons to consider re-
vision of the Condemnation Laws. Thereafter, on Septem-
ber 9, 1960, the Chairman of the Legislative Council desig-
nated five members of the General Assembly and the ten
members of the Bar Association committee as a joint com-
mittee of the Legislative Council, under the Chairmanship
of Senator Harry R. Hughes, to review the Condemnation
Laws.
The final report of that committee, dated November 14,
1962, recommended a complete revision of the Condemna-
tion Laws and contained a proposed new Condemnation
Code. It was approved by the Legislative Council at its
November, 1962, meeting, and the proposed new Code, with
a few amendments, was thereafter enacted into law by
Chapter 52 of the Laws of 1963.
6 It should be noted that the constitutional provision requiring the pay-
ment of just compensation is not a grant of power, but a limitation upon
the exercise of the sovereign power. Riden v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co.,
182 Md. 336, 35 A. 2d 99 (1944). It establishes merely the minimum to
be paid, and does not prevent the Legislature from increasing the amount
above the minimum, within the limits of equity and justice. Joslin Mfg.
Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923).
OMD. LAWS 1912, ch. 117, which added Art. 33A, entitled "Eminent
Domain".
As hereinafter mentioned bills were passed in 1959 providing for pay-
ment of moving costs where property is condemned and for compensation
where condemnation is abandoned, but even those provisions were sub-
stantially revised in the new Condemnation Code.
'MD. LAWS 1959, ch. 526 and 688 (codified 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 33A,
§§ 21A and 21B, prior to the adoption of the new Condemnation Code).
Effective June 1, 1963, it completely repealed Art. 33A and enacted the
new Condemnation Code as Art. 33A. The authors would be remiss were
it not to be noted that the Legislative Council Committee, its Chairman,
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It is not the purpose of this article to point out every
change, but rather to examine the major codifications or
substantive changes of the prior statutes and case law
which are of most importance to the practitioner and to
comment on the rationale thereof.
II. THE MORE SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS
A. Various Condemnation Procedures
Section 1 provides:
"All proceedings for the acquisition of private prop-
erty for public use by condemnation shall be governed
by the provisions of this article and of Subtitle U of
the Maryland Rules of Procedure; provided, however,
that nothing herein shall prevent the State of Mary-
land or any of its instrumentalities or political sub-
divisions, acting under statute or ordinance passed in
pursuance of Section 40A or Section 40B of Article III
of the Constitution of this State, from taking private
property for public use immediately upon making the
payment required thereunder and giving any security
required thereunder; and provided further that noth-
ing herein shall prevent the use by the State Roads
Commission of the procedure set forth in Sections 10
through 20, inclusive, of Article 89B of this Code; and
provided further that nothing herein shall prevent the
use by the City of Baltimore of the procedure set forth
in Sections 674 through 685, inclusive, of the Charter
and Public Local Laws of Baltimore City."
Section 1 does not confer the power of condemnation
on anyone. It merely requires that those having such
powers use the procedure set forth in Article 33A, with
the exceptions therein set forth.
Although the sovereign State has inherent powers of
condemnation, political subdivisions of the State have no
condemnation powers other than those directly, or by
necessary implication, conferred upon them by the State
Legislature. Where such power has been conferred upon
them, the manner of procedure provided in the Enabling
Act must be strictly followed. 10
Baltimore City has been given the power in section 6 (2)
of its Charter to acquire for public use by condemnation
members and staff, were warmly and deservedly commended by the Senate
Judiciary Committee, after its public hearing, for their outstanding work
on the new Code.10 Barnett v. Charles County, 206 Md. 478, 484, 112 A. 2d 492 (1955).
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any property in Baltimore City. Some incorporated mu-
nicipalities have similar power under Article 23A, section
2(24) of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Article 25, sec-
tion 3(b) grants a like power to the County Commis-
sioners of the counties (sixteen counties being excepted,
however). Some of the excepted counties have been given
condemnation powers by specific sections of Article 25, or
by Public Local Law. The charter counties of Maryland
have been given condemnation powers under Article 25A,
section 5(B). Section 162 of Article 23A confers specific
condemnation power for erosion districts in the counties;
and section 138 confers on them specific condemnation
power for roads.
Various quasi-public corporations have been given the
right to acquire property by eminent domain,1 and they
are also limited to the method set forth in Article 33A.
Certain specific State and county agencies have been
granted the right to condemn property and they too are
confined to the procedure contained in Article 33A.' 2 The
State Roads Commission of Maryland may use the pro-
cedures in Article 33A or may utilize the procedures under
Article 89B.
Section 1 preserves for Baltimore City the use of sec-
tions 674-685 of the Charter and Public Local Laws of Balti-
more City. These sections provide a simple and economical
method for condemning and opening and closing streets
after giving public notice, similar in some respects to that
which the State Roads Commission has under Article 89B,
as well as a quick-take procedure hereafter discussed."3
Quick-Take Procedures
Section 1 preserves any power derived through statute
or ordinance under section 40A or 40B of Article III of the
"Aeronautics - 1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 1A, §§ 13(C) & (D) ; Bridge
Companies - 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 23, § 141; Electric Cooperatives -
Art. 23, § 832; Gas Companies - Art. 23, § 341; Mining Companies - Art.
23, § 168; Railroad Companies - Art. 23, § 193; Telegraph & Telephone
Companies - Art. 23, § 340; Water Companies - Art. 23, § 333.
12 Board of Drainage Viewers - 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 25, § 80;
Drainage Commissioners - Art. 25, § 114; Erosion - Art. 25, § 162b;
Executive Department, Board of 'Public Works - 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art.
41, § 183; Ferries - Art. 37, §§ 4-6; Housing Authority - Art. 44A,
§ 8(d) ; Maryland Port Authority - 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 62B, § 6(c) ;
Prison Farms - 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 25, § 128 (excluding Frederick,
Garrett, Harford, Howard, Washington and Worcester Counties); Public
Roads - Art. 25, § 138; Sanitary Districts - 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 43,
§ 650(d) (8); State Board of Agriculture - Inspections, Mosquito Con-
trol - Art. 48, § 29; University of Maryland - MD. LAws 1963, ch. 332;
Water Sheds - 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 25, § 201.
See text, infra, at n. 16.
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Constitution to take private property for public use im-
mediately upon making the payment and giving any se-
curity required thereunder. 4
Constitutional authority for quick-take procedures for
acquiring property has been conferred only on Baltimore
City, Baltimore County, Montgomery County, the State as
to properties in Baltimore City, and the State Roads Com-
mission as to properties anywhere in the State. 5
Article III, section 40A authorizes the State or the City
of Baltimore to take immediate possession of property in
Baltimore City upon payment to the owners of such amount
as the State or the City of Baltimore, as the case may be,
shall estimate to be the fair value of said property, pro-
vided such legislation also requires the payment of any
further sum that may subsequently be added by a jury."
As to property in Baltimore County, section 40A pro-
vides that the Baltimore County Council may have a court
of record appoint a real estate appraiser to establish a value
of the property to be taken and that upon payment of that
sum to the owner or into court, and securing the payment
of any further sum that may be awarded by a jury, the
property may be taken.17
With regard to property in Montgomery County, section
40A provides that Montgomery County may use quick-take
proceedings, but only as to unimproved property to be used
for roads or streets. It may take such property after pay-
ment into court of the amount which a licensed real estate
broker, appointed by the County Council, estimates to be
the fair market value, provided the Council secures the pay-
ment of any further sum that may be awarded by a jury.8
Article III, section 40B provides that the Legislature
may authorize the State Roads Commission to acquire prop-
" MD. CONST., Art. III, §§ 40A and 40B.
Supra, n. 14.
26 The specific procedure for quick-take proceedings in Baltimore City
is set forth in section 678 of the Charter and P.L.L. of Baltimore City as
amended in 1963. Prior to the 1963 amendment, quick-take in Baltimore
City could be accomplished only by the court appointing three disinterested
appraisers to evaluate the property. That procedure proved too cumber-
some to be effective, and in 1962 Art. III, § 40A of the Constitution was
amended to eliminate the requirement of court appointed appraisers.
Thereafter section 678 of P.L.L. of Baltimore City was amended, by MD.
LAws 1963, ch. 372, to enable Baltimore City to take immediate possession
upon payment of the amount it estimates to be the fair value of the
property, which must be substantiated by the affidavits of two qualified
appraisers. It must, of course, pay any further sum that may be awarded
by the trier of the facts.
17 The specific procedure for quick-take proceedings in Baltimore County
is set forth in Code of P.L.L. of Baltimore County (1962) § 2-1.1.
"The specific procedure for quick-take proceedings in Montgomery County
is set forth in Code of P.L.L. of Montgomery County (1961) § 26-14A.
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erty for highway purposes by estimating the fair market
value of the land in question and paying to the property
owner or depositing with the court its estimate of the fair
value of the property, provided such legislation also re-
quires the payment of any further sum that may subse-
quently be awarded by a jury.
Pursuant thereto, the Legislature has given the Commis-
sion two methods of obtaining immediate possession. The
first method19 provides for the State Roads Commission to
estimate the fair market value of the property to be con-
demned and to tender this money to the owners or to de-
posit it in court. If sixty days elapse after completion of
the highway and the State Roads Commission and the
ptoperty owner are unable to agree on damages, then the
Commission is empowered to institute condemnation pro-
ceedings under Article 33A if it has not already been done
at the request of the condemrinee. °
The second method,2' which is available only as to un-
improved property, provides for the State Roads Commis-
sion to file plats with the court where the action is docketed
and to pay its estimate of damages to the owner or into
court and thereupon take possession. If six months pass
after recordation of the plats and the parties have not
agreed on damages, then the case is certified to the Prop-
erty Review Board to determine an award. Any dissatis-
fied litigant may appeal the action of the Board to the court
and have his case tried de novo under Article 33A.
B. Damages - Date of Valuation
Section 4 provides that:
"The value of the property sought to be condemned
and of any adjacent property of the defendant claimed
to be affected by the taking shall be determined as of
the date of the taking, if taking has occurred, or as of
the date of trial, if taking has not occurred, unless an
applicable statute specifies a different time as of which
the value is to be determined."
Section 4 of the new Condemnation Code provides that
the date of valuation shall be the date of the taking,22 if
' 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 89B, § 9.
" Veirs v. State Roads Commission, 217 Md. 545, 143 A. 2d 613 (1958).
"Supra, n. 19, §§ 10-20.
23 M .CODE (Cur. Supp. 1963) Art. 33A, § 14, provides that property
shall be deemed to have been taken:
"1. In cases in which the plaintiff is lawfully authorized to take the
property before trial pursuant to Section 40A or Section 40B of Article
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taking has occurred, or the date of the trial, if taking has not
occurred, unless an applicable statute specifies a different
time as of which the value is to be determined. 3 Section 4
is a new provision, but it follows the case law generally
as to the date of valuation,24 while preserving certain statu-
tory provisions for other dates of valuation. 25
C. Measure of Damages
1. Total Taking
Section 5(a) provides that the damages to be awarded
for the taking of an entire tract shall be its fair market
value as defined in section 6. That follows, without any
change, the case law which has been established by the
Court of Appeals.26
III of the constitution of this State, when the payment required there-
under has been made to the defendant or into court and any security
required thereunder has been given and the plaintiff has taken posses-
sion of the property and actually and lawfully appropriated it to the
public purposes of the plaintiff.
"2. In all other cases, upon payment of the judgment and costs by
the plaintiff pursuant to Subtitle U of the Maryland Rules."
2 The determination Of damages to be awarded as compensation for
taking of property in Maryland and the valuation date were determined
by ithe courts prior to the passage of the new Condemnation Code. For
purposes of clarity and easy understanding, the various factors making up
damages are set forth in the new Code. The new Code fixes the date of
valuation for determining damages (§ 4), defines the measure of damages
(§ 5), and defines what is the fair market value of condemned property
(§ 6). The Code follows generally the existing Maryland case law on those
matters, with certain adjustments, however, to meet particular problems.
State Roads Commission v. Warriner, 211 Md. 480, 484, 128 A. 2d 248
(1957) ; La Fontaine's Heirs v. La Fontaine's Heirs, 205 Md. 311, 318, 107
A. 2d 653 (1954) ; Building & Loan Assn. v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 166
Md. 348, 351, 171 A. 43 (1934) ; Dunne v. State, 162 Md. 274, 159 A. 751,
cert. den. 287 U.S. 564 (1932).
See, for example, 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 89B, § 15, which provides
that after the State Roads Commission records the plats and maps describ-
ing the condemned property and pays an amount of money estimated as
fair market value with the Clerk of the Court, it shall then attempt to
negotiate with the property owner in an attempt to agree on the question
of damages. The date of valuation is fixed us of the date the plats and
maps are recorded and the money paid but if both have not been done
simultaneously, then the valuation is determined as of the date of the
latter. Section 18 provides that if the State Roads Commission fails to
acquire title to the condemned property and to ascertain the amount to be
paid for it within one year from the date the plats or maps are recorded,
or fails to file a condemnation suit in the proper court, the value of the
property shall be determined as of the time of acquisition unless the value
is less at that time, in which case it will be the value as of the recorda-
tion date.
1 State Roads Commission v. Warriner, supra, n. 24; State Roads Com-
mission v. Wood, 207 Md. 369, 114 A. 2d 636 (1955) ; Johnson v. Gas &
Electric Co., 187 Md. 454, 50 A. 2d 918, 170 A.L.R. 709 (1947) ; Pumphrey
v. State Roads Commission, 175 Md. 498, 2 A. 2d 668 (1938) ; Consolidated
G.E.L. & P. Co. v. Baltimore, 130 Md. 20, 99 A. 968 (1917).
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2. Partial Taking
Section 5(b) provides as follows:
"The damages to be awarded where part of a tract
of land is taken shall be the fair market value (as de-
fined in section 6) of such part taken, but not less than
the actual value of the part taken plus the severance or
resulting damages, if any, to the remainder of the tract
by reason of the taking and of the future use by the
plaintiff of the part taken. Such severance or resulting
damages are to be diminished to the extent of the value
of the special (particular) benefits to the remainder
arising from the plaintiff's future use of the part taken."
Section 5(b) does not substantially alter the present
case law regarding a partial taking. The courts have con-
sistently defined the damages to be awarded in partial tak-
ing as the value of the part taken plus any severance or
consequential damages to the remainder of the tract by
reason of the taking. Ordinarily that measure can be as-
certained by comparing the fair market value of the entire
tract before the taking with its fair market value after the
taking, excluding from consideration any enhancement in
value resulting from the utilization of the land taken for
the purpose for which it was taken.17
Where the size and shape of the land taken preclude
the theory that it has any market value, the owner is never-
theless entitled to receive as an irreducible minimum the
actual value of what was taken, whether it be the fee or
an easement. In addition to that amount, he is entitled to
receive the consequential damages, if any, to the remainder
of the tract or parcel after the taking by reason of or in
consequence of the condemnor's future use and enjoyment
of the part taken. Such consequential damages are to be
diminished to the extent of the particular benefits, if any,
to the remainder of the tract or parcel arising from the
condemnor's future use of the part taken as distinguished
from the general benefits in which such remainder would
share with the other contiguous land in the neighborhood.28
3. Tenant's Chattels
Section 5(c) provides:
"For the purpose of determining the extent of
the taking and the valuation of the tenant's interest
Johnson v. Gas and Electric Co., supra, n. 26, 470; Pumphrey v. State
Roads Commission, supra, n. 26, 505, 17 Md. L. Rev. 277 (1957).
's Johnson v. Gas & Electric Co., 8upra, n. 26, 469; Realty Improvement
Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec., Light and Power Co. of Baltimore, 156 Md.
581, 588, 144 A. 710 (1929).
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in a proceeding for condemnation, no improvement or
installation which would otherwise be deemed part
of the realty shall be deemed personal property so as
to be excluded from the taking solely because of the
private right of a tenant, as against the owner of any
other interest in the property sought to be condemned,
to remove such improvement or installation, unless the
tenant exercises his right to remove the same prior to
the date when his answer is due, or elects in his answer
to exercise such right."
Although the Maryland courts have always followed
the general rule that fixtures are considered as part of
the land in determining its value in a condemnation pro-
ceeding,29 there has been some doubt in that regard as to
fixtures which a lessee or tenant has the right to remove.
In order to understand the problem and the purpose and
intent of section 5(c), it is well to review the law of
fixtures with particular reference to trade fixtures of a
lessee.
The term "fixture" is generally used in reference to
some originally personal chattel which has been actually
or constructively 0 affixed either to the soil itself or to
some structure legally a part of the soil." Under the early
rule of the common law, all fixtures were considered to
be a part of the freehold and passed with it. Thus, a tenant
could not remove from leased premises fixtures which he
2 The condemnee is entitled to the "fair market value of the land taken
as enhanced by the buildings and fixtures thereon." Baltimore City v.
Himmel, 135 Md. 65, 71, 107 A. 522 (1919). See n. 36, infra.
Originally, the article had to be actually annexed to be a fixture. That
rule proved to be too rigid in the case of machinery where the principal
part becomes a fixture by annexation, but a subsidiary part is not so
physically annexed. The courts in many states, including Maryland, solved
that dilemma years ago by adopting the principle of constructive annexa-
tion. Under that rule, if the subsidiary part which is not fastened to the
soil would not of itself be well adapted for general use elsewhere, and if
its removal would render the principal part unfit for use, the subsidiary
part is treated as a fixture. Anderson v. Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n.,
172 Md. 94, 99, 190 A. 747, 109 A.L.R. 1419 (1937) ; Warren Mfg. Co. v.
City of Baltimore, 119 Md. 188, 201, 86 A. 502 (1913) ; Dudley v. Hurst,
67 Md. 44, 50, 8 A. 901 (1887).
"Schofer v. Hoffman, 182 Md. 270, 274, 34 A. 2d 350 (1943) ; Dudley v.
Hurst, supra, n. 30, 47:
"The tests by which a fixture is determined are generally these:
"1st. Annexation to the realty, either actual or constructive.
"2nd. Adaptation to the use of that part of the realty with which
it is connected.
"3rd. The intention of the party making the annexation, to make the
article a permanent accession to the freehold, this intention being
inferred from the nature of the article annexed, the situation of the
party making the annexation, the mode of annexation, and the pur-
pose for which it was annexed."
19631
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installed.2 As a matter of public policy, however, a well-
recognized exception has evolved which permits a tenant
to remove trade fixtures installed or erected by him during
his term if such removal can be accomplished without
serious injury to the realty.
In condemnation proceedings, if the owner occupies the
premises being condemned, all fixtures are unquestionably
taken into consideration in determining the value of his
property being taken.34 Similarly, if a lessee installs fix-
tures which by the terms of the lease would revert to the
lessor at the end of the lease,35 those fixtures also are con-
sidered in determining the fair market value of the real
estate. Such fixtures also are considered in the valuation
of the lessee's interest, because the lessee is entitled to re-
ceive the difference for the unexpired term of the lease
between (1) the economic or fair market rental value of
the leased premises as improved by the tenant, and (2)
the contract or lease rent.36 Thus, if the rental value of
the leased premises is increased by the fixtures installed
by the lessee in reasonable proportion to the amount ex-
pended for them, the lessee, in effect, is reimbursed for
them.3 7
Since the condemnor should pay the fair market value
of the land as enhanced by the fixtures thereon, one might
8Thompson Ry. Co. v. Young, 90 Md. 278, 281, 44 A. 1024 (1899).
I Anderson v. Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., supra, n. 30, 98; Dudley
v. Hurst, supra, n. 30, 50. By virtue of Art. 53, § 38, the right of a tenant
to remove fixtures erected by him under one demise or term shall not be
lost or in any manner impaired by reason of his acceptance of a new lease
of the same premises without any intermediate surrender of possession.
4 Baltimore City v. Hlimmel, 135 Md. 65, 71, 107 A. 522 (1919).
" The general right of a tenant to remove trade fixtures may be con-
trolled by an express contract with the landlord, but covenants restricting,
or claiming to restrict, the tenant's ordinary right to remove such fixtures
are always strictly construed and cannot be extended by implication.
Rasch v. Safe D. & T. Co., 136 Md. 435, 438, 111 A. 121 (1920).
-City of Baltimore v. Gamse, 132 Md. 290, 296-298, 104 A. 429 (1918).
To be precise, the measure of the lessee's damages is more correctly stated
as the difference in market value of the lessee's interest before and after
the taking. Where there is a complete taking of the lessee's interest, the
damages will be the difference between the economic or market rent and
the contract or lease rent, but that is not necessarily so where there is
only a partial taking of the lessee's interest. The market value of the
lessee's interest after a partial taking may be affected by any of the terms
of the lease (for example, whether he has to pay for alterations or repairs
necessary to make the property tenantable), in addition to the amount of
rent he will have to pay thereafter. Veirs v. State Roads Commission,
217 Md. 545, 143 A. 2d 613 (1958) ; City of Baltimore v. Rice, 73 Md. 307,
21 A. 181 (1891). The total allowance to all defendants, including lessors
and lessees, may not exceed the value of the land taken plus the conse-
quential damages, Veirs v. State Roads Commission, except in cases in-
volving property subject to ground rents, Baltimore v. Latrobe, 101 Md. 621,
61 A. 203 (1905).
Supra, n. 36.
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expect that the result would be the same even if the lessee
had the right to remove the fixtures. Most courts hold
that all fixtures must be treated as real estate in determin-
ing the total award, but that, in apportioning the award
as between lessor and lessee, the fixtures installed by the
lessee must be treated as personal property and credited
to the lessee if he has the right to remove them38 or if the
lessor is required to pay him the value of the fixtures
under the terms of the lease or other agreement. 9 Some
courts, however, hold that the right of removal releases
the condemnor from its obligation to pay for such fixtures,
on the theory that, since they are treated as personal
property as between the lessor and lessee, they should not
be valued as part of the real estate.4 ° Prior to the enact-
ment of the new Condemnation Code, Maryland was gen-
erally considered as being in accord with the latter view.4
Section 5(c) of the new Condemnation Code now puts
Maryland with the majority in requiring all fixtures to be
considered as real estate in determining the extent of the
taking, unless the tenant exercises his right to remove
them prior to the time his answer is due or elects in his
answer to exercise such right.
4. Valuation of Church
Section 5 (d) of the new Code provides:
"The damages to be awarded for the taking of a
structure held in fee simple, or under a lease renew-
able forever, by or for the benefit of a religious body
and regularly used by such religious body as a church
88 Supra, n. 35.
' 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (Rev. 3rd ed. 1962), § 13.12, pp. 364-365,
§ 13.121, pp. 376-378.
10 Ibid., § 13.121, p. 377.
4 Ibid., fn. 17, citing City of Baltimore v. GamSe, supra, n. 36; Report
No. 31 of the Research Division of the Legislative Council, dated August,
1958, pp. 9, 14, also relying on the Gamse case. It should be observed that
the Gamse case did not specifically decide the question (the actual de-
cision having been that it was error to instruct the jury that it could
consider moving costs in assessing the lessee's damages), and could have
been otherwise distinguished. For example, the Court there noted at
pp. 295-6:
"The appellees, as we have said, have not shown thaot they were to
be paid for the permanent improvements made by them or that such
improvements were to be their property at the expiration of their
tenancy, and, therefore, to allow them for said improvements, which
they have not shown they are entitled to, might result in paying them
for something to which they have no claim or right."
It is thus possible that had the specific issue been raised in a later case,
the Court of Appeals might have followed the majority rule. Cf. the
reference to the Gamse case in Anno., "Condemnation - Tenant's Struc-
tures", 75 A.L.R. 1495, 1499; Anno., "Eminent Domain - Lessee's Dam-
ages", 3 A.L.R. 2d 287, 305.
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or place of religious worship, shall be the reasonable
cost as of the valuation date, of erecting a new struc-
ture of substantially the same size and of comparable
character and quality of construction as the acquired
structure at some other suitable and-comparable loca-
tion within the State of Maryland to be provided by
such religious body. Such damages shall be in addition
to the damages to be awarded for the land on which
the condemned structure is located."
Because of the unique nature and use of church struc-
tures and the difficulty of finding a suitable replacement
on the market, a bill42 was enacted by the Legislature
in 1945 providing that, where a place of worship is con-
demned, the jury shall take into consideration the fair
value of the place of worship so condemned and the differ-
ence between its fair value and the cost of erecting or con-
structing a new building of substantially the same size,
type, design and character of construction as the con-
denned structure.
The Legislative Council committee's original draft of
section 5(d) provided that the damages for the taking of
a place of worship "shall in no event be less than the mini-
mum reasonable cost of erecting a new structure of sub-
stantially the same size, type, design and character of
construction as the acquired structure at some other suit-
able and comparable location within the State of Maryland
to be provided by such religious body."
That provision would have allowed full reproduction
costs, without depreciation. It was pointed out to the Com-
mittee that frequently in urban renewal areas old ornate
churches will have been bought a relatively short period of
time prior to condemnation for a small fraction of their
reproduction cost and that a considerable portion of the
reproduction cost would be attributable to ornate and non-
utilitarian features that would not be included in any
church being built today. An amendment was proposed
under which the church would receive the fair market
value, "but not less than the minimum reasonable cost of
erecting a new structure of substantially the same capacity
that would serve the same purposes."
The Legislative Council committee thereafter redrafted
section 5(d) and adopted it in its present form, "changing
the statute to make the damages the reasonable cost of
erecting a comparable new structure at another location. '4 3
"2 MD. LAWS 1945, ch. 804, § 9A.
" The Committee's Report, November 14, 1962, p. 17.
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D. Fair Market Value
Section 6 reads as follows:
"The fair market value of property in a proceeding
for condemnation shall be the price as of the valuation
date for the highest and best use of such property
which a seller, willing but not obligated to sell, would
accept for the property, and which a buyer, willing
but not obligated to buy, would pay therefor exclud-
ing any increment in value proximately caused by the
public project for which the property condemned is
needed, plus the amount, if any, by which such price
reflects a diminution in value occurring between the
effective date of legislative authority for the acquisi-
tion of such property and the date of actual taking if
the trier of facts shall find that such diminution in
value was proximately caused by the public project
for which the property condemned is needed, or by
announcements or acts of the plaintiff or its officials
concerning such public project, and was beyond the
reasonable control of the property owner.
If the condemnor is vested with a continuing power
of condemnation, the phrase the effective date of legis-
lative authority for the acquisition of such property, as
used in this section, shall mean the date of specific ad-
ministrative determination to acquire such property."
The traditional concept of fair market value of con-
demned property has always been the amount which a
willing buyer would pay a willing seller as of the valuation
date, taking into consideration the highest and best use
of the property, but excluding any enhancement in the
value of the property caused by the public project for
which the property is condemned." The latter factor is
excluded from the determination of the fair market value
of the condemned property so that the owner will not
receive a windfall.
On the other hand, the public project may have the
effect of depreciating the value of the condemned property.
Tenants frequently move when they learn that the prop-
erty is to be condemned. In addition, a more or less fre-
quent turnover of tenants is normal in urban renewal areas.
It is obviously difficult to get new tenants to move into
an area slated for condemnation. The result is vacant
structures which frequently are vandalized and badly dam-
"State Roads Commission v. Warriner, 211 Md. 480, 485, 128 A. 2d 248
(1957) ; Pumphrey v. State Roads Commission, 178 Md. 498, 506, 2 A. 2d 668.
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aged. Such property may thus have depreciated substan-
tially as of the valuation date.
Prior to the enactment of the new Code, property
owners had to bear such losses. That inequity, however, is
cured by section 6. It allows the condemnee to receive as
part of his damages the amount, if any, by which the prop-
erty has diminished in value between the effective date of
legislative authority for the acquisition of the property45
and the date of actual taking if the trier of facts finds that
such diminution in value was proximately caused by the
public project itself or by announcements or acts of the
plaintiff or its officials concerning such public project and
was beyond the reasonable control of the property owner.
Thus it will be observed that section 6 follows substan-
tially the present case law except for the allowance of
damages for any such announcements or acts of the con-
demnor. That addition, however, is one of the most dra-
matic in the new Code.
Methods of Valuation
There are three acceptable methods of valuation: (1)
comparative sales;46 (2) replacement cost (the reproduc-
tion cost of the buildings and fixtures, less physical and
economic depreciation, plus the value of the land) ;47 and
(3) capitalization of income.4" Which is more reliable will
vary with the type of property being evaluated. One of
the methods may be given principal reliance, with the
others being used as a method of checking its validity. 9
' In a municipality having the power of condemnation, but requiring an
ordinance to implement it, the effective date of legislative authority for the
acquisition of the property would be the date of the enactment of the con-
demnation ordinance. In the case of the State Roads Commission or any
other agency having a continuing power of condemnation, the effective date
of legislative authority for the acquisition of the property would be the
date of the specific administrative determination to acquire the property.
41 Hance v. State Roads Commission, 221 Md. 164, 174, 156 A. 2d 644
(1959) ; Lustine v. State Roads Commission, 217 Md. 274, 280, 142 A. 2d
56 (1958) ; State Roads Commission v. Wood. 207 Md. 369, 373, 114 A. 2d
636 (1955); Baltimore v. Brick Co., 80 Md. 458, 473, 31 A. 423 (1895) ; 1
ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN (2nd Ed.) § 136, et seq.; 5
NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (Rev. 3rd ed. 1962) § 21.1. et 8eq.
41 Bergeman v. State Roads Commission, 213 Md. 137, 143, 146 A. 2d 48
(1958) ; 2 ORGEL, op. cit. supra, n. 46, § 188, et seq.; 5 NICHOLS, op. cit.
supra, n. 46, § 20.1 et seq. The use of this method is allowed only if the
buildings are well adapted to the land and its surroundings, and their
structural value represents a fairly proportionate enhancement of the
market value of the land. Baltimore City v. Himmel, 135 Md. 65, 70-72,
107 A. 522 (1919). 4 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra, n. 39, § 13.12.
11 Bergeman v. State Roads Commission, supra, n. 47; Pumphrey v. State
Roads Commission, supra, n. 44, 510; 1 OROEL, op. cit. supra, n. 46, § 176,
et seq.; 5 NICHOLS, Op. cit. supra, n. 46, sec. 19.1, et seq.
49 5 NICHOLS, op. cit. supra, n. 47, § 19.1. Cf. Bergeman v. State Roads
Commission, supra, n. 47, 143.
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In using the income method, income in the nature of
profits for a business is generally not admissible evidence
of the value of the premises on which the business is
located, but income in the nature of rentals is admissible.
To the extent, however, that the business profits of a par-
ticular location will affect the fair market rental for such
place, business profits are admissible.5 °
Historically the condemnee has been entitled to market
value based on the highest and best use for which his prop-
erty was fitted even though it was not actually being used
for that purpose at the time of the condemnation.5 His
award, however, must be based upon actual market value
at the time of the trial or at the time of the taking if taking
has already occurred. If it is claimed then, that the prop-
erty has a higher and better use than the one for which
it is being used on the valuation date, there must be at
least some probability that it would be used for such pur-
pose within a reasonable time.52
E. Costs
Like the prior Code,53 section 7 provides that all costs
in the trial court shall be paid by the plaintiff. In addition
it contains several new provisions. One of them requires
the plaintiff to pay the cost of all documentary stamps
that may be required in the transfer of the property to the
plaintiff.54 However, the Internal Revenue Code provides
that a municipality condemnor shall not be liable for federal
documentary stamps and that the affixing of stamps by such
condemnor shall not be deemed payment for the tax, which
may be collected by assessment from the condemnee.55
Another noteworthy change is the allowance to the de-
fendant of reasonable legal, appraisal and engineering fees
1o State Roads Commission v. Novosel, 203 Md. 619, 102 A. 2d 563 (1954).
"Bonaparte v. City of Baltimore, 131 Md. 80, 101 A. 594 (1917) ; City
of Baltimore v. Carroll, 128 Md. 68, 96 A. 1076 (1916). The general measure
of damages in condemnation cases is the fair market value of the land
at the time of the taking, and in determining this, consideration may be
given to any utility to which the land is adapted and for which it is
immediately available. Testimony may be admitted to show a substantial
probability of a rezoning of the property for a different use which would
make the property more valuable, but no element or enhancement of
market value may be based upon the mere possibility that at some time
in the future a reclassification or rezoning might occur. State Roads
Commission v. Warriner, 211 Md. 480, 485, 128 A. 2d 248 (1957).
"The trier of fact was never permitted to enter the realm of speculation
and swell damages beyond the value on the valuation date by fantastic
visions as to future possibilities or exigencies. Brack v. City of Balto., 128
Md. 430, 441, 97 A. 548 (1916).
Formerly Art. 33A, § 14; formerly MD. RULE U-9.
"3 'MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1963) Art. 33A, § 7b(4).
26 U.S.C.A. § 4361 (1955) ; Internal Revenue Ruling 57-72.
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actually incurred by the defendant due to the condemna-
tion proceedings if the judgment is for the defendant on
the right to condemn.56 Under the former law, only a
counsel fee was awarded and then only where the Court
of Appeals decided that the petitioner was not entitled to
condemn the property.5 7
Another new provision is that, when the condemning
authority has elected to use the "quick-take" procedure
under section 40A or section 40B of Article III of the Con-
stitution of Maryland, the defendant is entitled to receive
interest at the rate of 6% on the difference, if any, between
the amount of money initially paid into court and the award
of the jury, from the date the money was paid into court
until the date of the inquisition or final judgment, which-
ever date is later."
F. Moving Costs
It has been noted earlier that both the federal and state
constitutions guarantee "just compensation" 59 for the tak-
ing of private property for a public purpose. However, this
safeguard pertains solely to real property. In the absence
of statutory provisions, the condemnee is required to bear
the cost of moving his personal property whether he is a
businessman or a home owner. For the first time in Mary-
land, an express statutory grant of moving costs was en-
acted in 1959.60 It was extended in 19611 and an even fur-
ther liberalization has been achieved through the enact-
ment of section 12 of the new Condemnation Code.
When Allowed
Section 12(a) provides for the condemnor to pay a
pecuniary allowance for the removal of personalty to an-
other location, within a reasonable distance, provided the
condemnee has made his claim for these moving costs
within six months after the actual removal. It excludes,
however, the lost of profit or of good will or the cost of
acquiring another location.
As originally drawn section 12 provided that moving
costs would be paid only if the removal and relocation were
1 Supra, n. 54, § 7b (5). Similar expenses are allowed under § 13d when
condemnation proceedings are abandoned.
Formerly Art. 33A, § 16.
Supra, n. 54, § 7e.
6 Supra, n. 2-3.
0 MD. LAWS 1959, ch. 688 (codified as Art. 33A, § 21B, prior to the adop-
tion of the new Condemnation Code).
'MD. LAws 1961, ch. 286 (codified as Art. 33A, § 21B, prior to the adop-
tion of the new Condemnation Code).
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accomplished within one year after the date of acquisition
of the real estate. That was later discarded by the Legisla-
tive Council committee as being unduly restrictive. It was
pointed out to the committee that in a large urban area a
condemnor may acquire a number of properties by negotia-
tion more than a year before it is necessary for the owner
or tenant to vacate, inasmuch as it might take that much
time to acquire the other properties.
Since a condemnor would not require an occupant to
move until it actually needs the property, a one year man-
datory restriction would unduly penalize the occupant and
cause him to move before it was necessary or else forfeit
his moving expenses. The committee then imposed a re-
quirement that the claim for moving expenses must be
submitted within six months after moving. A similar re-
quirement is imposed by the federal government where
federal funds are involved.2
Subsection (g) also requires the person moving to give
a written notice to the condemnor at least ten days prior
to the date of removal stating the date of intended re-
moval, the identification of the things to be moved and
the place of relocation. He also must give the condemnor,
upon request, a reasonable opportunity to inspect the
articles to be moved.
Premises Occupied By Tenants
Subsection (b) cures what was a constant complaint of
tenants whose leases had only short terms remaining.
Under the law as amended in 1961,3 the owner or tenant
occupying residential property and the owner occupying
commercial or industrial premises were allowed full mov-
ing costs. However, any occupant of business premises
other than the owner was not entitled to receive moving
costs in excess of $2,500.00 if the term of his lease did not
extend three years or more beyond the date of acquisition,
and, in any event, not more than $5,000.00.
Under new section 12, full moving costs are allowed
for personal property which the lessor could have required
to be removed at the expiration of the lease, with the
exception that the allowance of moving costs to any lessee
is diminished by one-fifth for each year by which five years
exceeds the number of full years remaining in the term
el Regulations of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, § 3.109(2) (b),
dated June 27, 1961 (26 Fed. Reg. 5712-15), prescribed pursuant to § 106(f)
of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1456 (1957).
MD. LAWS 1961, ch. 286 (codified as Art. 33A, § 21B, prior to the adop-
tion of the new Condemnation Code).
19631
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
of his lease at the time when the premises are acquired
and with the further exception that the adjustment may
not be used in any event to reduce the allowance below
$2,500.00. Any option to renew or extend the lease is
treated as having been exercised and the term is deemed
to include such renewal term or extension.
Not To Exceed Value
Section 12 (c) provides that the moving allowance shall
not exceed the fair market value of the property moved.
It also provides, however, that the condemnor shall not be
required to obtain an expert or detailed appraisal before
payment of moving costs. The latter phrase was added
after it was suggested to the committee that the con-
demnor might otherwise be expected to have appraisals
made of all personal property to be moved in order to be
assured that the moving costs do not exceed the value of
the property moved. Obviously, such appraisals would add
immeasurably to the cost of property acquisition and the
aggregate appraisal cost would greatly exceed the aggregate
moving costs that might be saved.
Unreasonable Distance
Subsection (d) provides that when personal property is
moved an unreasonable distance, the allowance of moving
costs shall not be totally defeated, but that no compensa-
tion shall be allowed for any additional cost resulting from
the unreasonable distance of the new location. The prior
moving cost statutes did not contain that provision; there
was, accordingly, some doubt as to whether the lessee was
entitled to any moving allowance if he moved his personal
property to a new location that was not within a reason-
able distance.
Claimant Must Be User
Subsection (e) simply provides that no person may be
allowed moving costs for personal property unless the per-
sonalty was used by him at his original location and is to
be used by him at the new location. It was inserted to
prevent abuse of the moving costs provisions.
Determination of Amount and Limitation
Subsection (f) applies when the condemnor and the
person entitled to moving costs are unable to reach an
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amicable agreement on the amount of moving costs. In
that case, either of the parties may file a petition in the
court where the condemnation proceedings were filed, or,
if there were no such proceedings, in any court of law in
which any part of the premises is located. No such peti-
tion may be filed more than one year after the date the
personal property was removed from the premises. 4
Federal Funds
Subsection (i) provides that nothing in section 12 shall
be construed as placing a limit on the amount of compen-
sation that the condemnor may allow for moving expenses
in cases where such compensation may be paid or where
the condemnor will be reimbursed wholly or partly out of
federal funds.
G. Abandonment
In the past, a condemnor had an unfettered right65 to
abandon condemnation proceedings until compensation had
been paid or tendered or until the authorized appropriation
of the property for public use had actually taken place.6
That right, however, is now limited by section 13.
Section 13, subsection (c), provides that no proceeding
for condemnation may be abandoned after taking" has
occurred, nor more than 120 days after the entry of finaljudgment, unless an appeal is taken therefrom, nor more
than 120 days after receipt by the clerk of the lower court
of the mandate of the Court of Appeals if an appeal is taken
from a final judgment.
For the purposes of section 13, if an appeal taken by the
condemnor is stricken out pursuant to Maryland Rule 813
or voluntarily abandoned, it shall be deemed not to have
been taken; but if an appeal taken by the defendant is so
stricken out or voluntarily abandoned, the plaintiff may
abandon the proceeding within 120 days after the appeal
S3 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1963) Art. 33A, § 12(h).
Friendship Cemetery v. City of Baltimore, 197 Md. 610, 81 A. 2d 57(1951) ; State v. Ambrose, 191 Md. 353, 62 A. 2d' 359 (1948) ; Beall v.
Redmiles, 176 Md. 677, 6 A. 2d 551 (1939) ; Norris v. Baltimore, 44 Md. 598
(1876). The owner, however, was protected where there Was bad faith,
Friendship Cemetery of Anne Arundel County v. Baltimore, 200 Md. 430,
90 A. 2d 695 (1952).
"Lord Calvert Theatre v. Baltimore, 208 Md. 606, 611, 119 A. 2d 415(1956) ; LaFontaine's Heirs v. LaFontaine's Heirs, 205 Md. 311, 319, 107
A. 2d 653 (1954) ; State v. Ambrose, supra, n. 65; Pittsnogle v. Western
Md. Ry. Co., 123 Md. 667, 91 A. 831 (1914) ; Norris v. Baltimore, supra,
n. 65.
'As to when taking occurs, see 3 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1963) Art. 33A,§ 14.
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is so abandoned or stricken out, provided a taking has
not occurred.
The new Code also directs the procedure to be used for
abandoning a condemnation proceeding. Subsection (a)
of section 13 provides that the exclusive method of aban-
doning a proceeding for condemnation shall be by filing in
the proceeding a written election to abandon it. A copy of
such election must be served as provided in Maryland Rule
306 upon each defendant who has been personally sub-
jected to the jurisdiction of the court, and every other
defendant must be notified of such election by service of a
copy thereof or by such other means as the court may
direct.
Under prior law, it frequently was difficult to ascertain
whether there had been an abandonment. Generally, it was
a question of fact for the jury rather than a question of
law. 8 The new Code eliminates the uncertainty.
Subsection (d) of section 13 provides that upon an
abandonment the defendants are entitled to recover from
the condemning authority the reasonable legal, appraisal
and engineering fees actually incurred by them as a result
of the condemnation action.6 9 That provision was originally
passed in 195970 and was made a part of the new Code
without change.
III. FINAL OBSERVATIONS
The major contributions of the new Condemnation Code
are twofold: (1) it simplifies and streamlines the pro-
cedure for condemnation cases, and (2) it requires con-
demnees to be compensated for monetary losses and dam-
ages not previously compensable. It is believed that the
new Code will be of benefit to both condemnor and con-
demnee, without imposing an undue burden on either
of them.
1 Wagner v. Bealmear & Son Company, 135 Md. 690, 109 A. 466 (1920);
Petroli v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 166 Md. 431, 171 A. 45 (1934);
Black v. City of Baltimore, 50 Md. 235 (1879).
10This provision is similar to Art. 33A, § 7b(5), allowing similar fees
when the judgment is for the defendant on the right to condemn.
70 MD. LAWS 1959, ch. 526 (codified as Art. 33A, § 21B, prior to the adop-
tion of the new Condemnation Code).
